University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles

Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship

1996

This Could Be Your Culture--Junk Speech in a Time of Decadence
Pierre Schlag
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law
and Philosophy Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Law and Society Commons

Citation Information
Pierre Schlag, This Could Be Your Culture--Junk Speech in a Time of Decadence, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1801
(1996) (reviewing Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Death of Discourse (1996)), available at
http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/692/.

Copyright Statement

Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is
required.
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado
Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lauren.seney@colorado.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1801 1995-1996
Provided by:
William A. Wise Law Library

Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Jun 13 17:56:14 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information

BOOK REVIEW
THIS COULD BE YOUR CULTURE - JUNK SPEECH IN
A TIME OF DECADENCE
THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE. By Ronald K.L. Collins' and David M.
Skover. 2 Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. 1996. Pp. xxv, 294.
$49.95 (cloth), $16.95 (paper).

Reviewed by Pierre Schlag3
The Death of Discourse closes with a quote from Albert Camus: "I
do not give the human race more than one chance in a thousand. But
I should not be a man if I did not operate on that one chance" (p.
216). 4 After finishing The Death of Discourse, however, the reader
might well wonder whether Camus has not overstated the odds for the
human race. Indeed, The Death of Discourse is relentless in exploring
the depths of our predicament.
Stated most broadly, the predicament is this: with the perfection of
communications technology, the refinement of capitalist rationality,
and the intensification of market-created desire, the resulting culture is
one that renders its own ostensible steering mechanism - namely,
reasoned discourse - impossible. This broad scale rendition of the
predicament is quite bleak, for there is no exit; everyone is included.
We are all living in a culture that is, quite literally, doing itself in,
mindlessly devoting itself to frivolous self-amusement: the unbridled
pursuit of thrills, chills, titillations, fun, and ultimately, death.
At various times, the authors' arguments tend toward this broad
scale rendition of the predicament. But most often, Collins and
Skover focus on the smaller scale. There, the variables of our impending catastrophe crystallize into more concrete and possibly more manageable identities. Communications technology is represented by
electronic media; commercialism, by advertising; the marketing of
human desire, by pornography; and the realm of reasoned discourse,
by First Amendment freedom of speech.
The predicament becomes more familiar: as Collins and Skover put
it, the unholy troika of electronic media, advertising, and pornography
has produced a discursive universe and a citizenry incompatible with
1 Visiting Professor, Seattle University School of Law. Co-founder, Center for the Study of
Commercialism.
2 Professor, Seattle University School of Law.
3 Nicholas Rosenbaum Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. The reviewer has
known both Skover and Collins for a decade and was a colleague of Skover's at Seattle University School of Law.
4 Collins and Skover are quoting an interview of Camus from 1945.
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lofty First Amendment free speech values. The First Amendment, as
they render it, is supported by a belief in the importance of meaningful dissent, political self-government, and deliberative democracy. In
short, the First Amendment is grounded in a Madisonian model that
places its faith in the possibility of reasoned discourse (pp. 201-03).
For Collins and Skover, neither the Madisonian faith nor its ideals can
be squared with the actual mass communication of our popular culture (pp. 201-03).
How so? The thrust of their argument focuses overwhelmingly on
one side of this tension - on a sustained examination of the character
and the effects of electronic media, advertising, and pornography. Interestingly, they leave the concept of reasoned discourse (the thing that
will die in the end) relatively untheorized. Rather, their argument relies implicitly on the reader's presumed understanding of what reasoned discourse might be. They presume (and probably, in most cases,
rightfully so) that whatever that understanding is, it will be incompatible with their description of electronic media, advertising, and
pornography.
The recurring gesture in Collins and Skover's argument is thus to
remind the reader of the brute realities of electronic media, advertising, and pornography. The gesture is not so much an exercise in ratiocination as an exercise in disclosure - a sustained attempt to shatter
panglossian First Amendment fantasies and to reveal the actual realm
of speech. It is a jolt into awareness - channel surfing in print:
ZAP
"Zip it, puke breath," admonishes the host. "Mort! Mort! Mort!" exclaims
the horde.
ZAP
TV Guide looks back on the i98os and ranks its "Top 20." Oprah Winfrey trumps Ronald Reagan, Vanna White tops Sam Donaldson, and
Hulk Hogan trounces Dan Rather, who narrowly beats out Pee-Wee
Herman.
ZAP
...NBC and Geraldo Rivera team up to produce an expos6 on devil
worship. The result: "the highest Nielsens ever for a two-hour
documentary."
ZAP
In a more serious vein, Diane Sawyer, an ABC News journalist on
PrimeTime, asks the former mistress of entrepreneur Donald Tyump:
"Tell me, Maria, was it really the best sex you ever had?"
ZAP
A future president, Bill Clinton, decked out in dark hipster glasses, does
a mean sax gig on the Arsenio Hall show.
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ZAP
Race-and-riot-torn Los Angeles fires up while the Cosby Show winds
down (pp. io-ii (footnotes omitted)).
Next come the commercials as Collins and Skover offer unforgiving descriptions of the conceptual content of commercial advertising.
As they put it:
There is no place for the mind in the marketplace.
...
[How would you] determine the truth or falsity of the following
commercial messages?
" Soft-drink commercial depicting a rock singer performing in front of,
and mingling with, a teenage audience at a drive-in movie theater:
"Don't care about movie stars who live in Hollywood. Don't like
their attitude; don't think I ever could. Don't want the good taste, I
know what tastes good. Why is the best thing always misunderstood?
Just give me what the doctor ordered. Just what the doctor ordered.
Hey, give me a [brand named soda]."
* Cigarette ad with a man and two women frolicking in a swimming
pool: "Alive with pleasure!"
* Designer-jeans ad with a woman unzipping a man's trousers; opposite page photograph of man raising third finger of right hand in obscene gesture: [Brand name of product].
" Cologne ad supposedly picturing a father holding his young son:
"[Brand name] for Men" (pp. iog-io (some alterations in original)).
After the commercial, Collins and Skover move on to the pornographic. To a large extent, the pornographic is represented by Collins
and Skover's virtual character, Anthony. Anthony is always on the
lookout for autoerotic possibility, which is to say, First Amendment
material: "Anthony enters a sex shop on New Orleans's Bourbon
Street, walks directly to the erotic clothes rack, and gawks at shiny
black rubber skirts and stockings. The rubber speaks to him and he
knows it" (p. II
(emphasis added)).
Collins and Skover's work is a compilation of such intrusions.
Their text is punctuated with boxed quotes from the famous (Ronald
Reagan), the infamous (Marquis de Sade), the heroic (Vdclav Havel),
the informed (Carl Bernstein), the reckless (Camille Paglia), the confused (Cass Sunstein), the bilious (Jesse Helms), the Sixties (Bob Dylan), and the dead (James Madison). Following each of the book's
three main sections, Collins and Skover engage in dialogue with their
critics: a crew of academics, legal officials, journalists, and communications experts (who have responded to Collins and Skover's prior
works).
Death of Discourse is an anti-book - an attempt at multimedia in
print form. Hence, the section on electronic media not only mimics
channel surfing, but also marshals evidence in the clipped speech patterns of T.V. news shows. The section on advertising is continually
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interrupted by box messages from whomever Collins and Skover take
to be their sponsor: "Information Advertising - an idea that's gone
the way of the Remington typewriter" (p. 74). And then, of course,
there is the ubiquitous Anthony.
Amidst these shards of American culture, Collins and Skover
weave a narrative in which reason, discourse, and the old First
Amendment verities are systematically overwhelmed by the realities of
the unholy troika.

A

SINISTER SYNERGY

At various points, Collins and Skover's description reveals a sinister synergy among electronic media, commercialism, and pornography
(pp. 76, 147-48, i6o). Their argument very much echoes Herbert Marcuse's critical assessment of the congruence of technology, commercial
culture, and repressive desublimation, The difference is that Marcuse's writing was largely prophetic, whereas Collins and Skover write
about something that has already largely happened. What emerges
from their description of the unholy troika is an intricate web of
symbiotic interconnections; each of the practices appropriates and intensifies the others.
Consider first the development of the electronic media. There was
radio, then T.V., then cable T.V., then pay-per-view, then virtual reality. With each new technological advance, there has been a further
intensification of the pornographic. Electronic media appropriate pornography to expand their markets, in turn opening up new venues of
pornographic possibility. The electronic media likewise appropriate
and intensify the commercial. Thus, with advances in such media,
there are new opportunities and, more importantly, new market-driven
requirements that commercial enterprises make use of the new media
to promote their goods. Hence, commercial enterprises are not only
allowed, but forced by competitive pressures, to advertise via radio,
T.V., rental videos, movies, and now even the Internet.
Commercial advertising appropriates the pornographic imagination
to sell products and services. A tremendous number of products are
marketed as sexual accoutrements - everything from cars to breakfast
cereals to jeans. This practice becomes ever more obvious as advertising becomes increasingly steeped in the pornographic aesthetic of the
transgressive and the exhibitionist. The message is to "break the
rules" (that is, buy and consume). The result is a sexualization of commodity consumption and, ultimately, experience. The pornographic
mind-set is intensified as it breaks out of its traditional fora (pictures,
books, magazines, and movies) into a form of consciousness - a generalized approach to life and world. The pornographic is thus tran5 See

HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN 56-143 (1964).
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substantiated from substance into form, creating what Collins and
Skover call, in a deliberate play on words, "the pornographic state" (p.
139): something that is at once a type of political organization, an orientation, and a form of life.
Pornography appropriates the electronic media by transforming entertainment into a series of sensory experiences. Electronic entertainment is aimed at producing ever more frightening, shocking, thrilling,
disgusting, or revolting images. Thus, electronic media come to resemble pornography - weak on narrative, strong on the repeated evocation, deferral, and fulfillment of desire. Similarly, the pornographic
appropriates the commercial by transforming the logic of the commodity (consume!) into that of the image (fantasize!). The value of products is no longer limited" simply to fulfilling a need or a function (real
or imagined). Products -

much like pornography -

must do much

more: they must create a mood, a desire, an attitude, a lifestyle. What
6
the public consumes, then, is an image of itself consuming an image.
Indeed, one of the dizzying effects of reading Collins and Skover's
book is that, by the end, an uncanny resemblance has developed
among the logics of electronic media, commercial advertising, and pornography. Although it remains possible, of course, to advance definitions that distinguish each of them, such distinctions will seem
somewhat artificial; their conflation turns out to be more important.
Of course, this conflation occurs in part because a great many instances of the one are also instances of the other two. But there is far
more to it than that: there is also a transposition of the aesthetic of
each into those of the others. As the boundaries blur, the aesthetics of
electronic media, commercialism, and pornography become isomorphic.
THE EFFECTS

For Collins and Skover, the unholy troika produces significant deleterious effects that obstruct reasoned discourse. This obstruction
takes various forms.
Impoverished Substance
The most obvious deleterious effect stems from the content (or lack
of content) of junk speech. Collins and Skover argue that a steady
diet of degrading, trivial, vulgar, demeaning, ugly, stupid, and vile
speech tends to inscribe the very same qualities in viewers and listeners (pp. 23, 152). The understandings, visions, and connections represented in this junk speech lack any cognitive virtue: no truth, no
beauty, no goodness, no enlightenment. To the extent that these char"What if all advertising were an apologia not for a product but for advertising itself?"
EvIL - ESSAYS ON EXTREME PHENOMENA 50
(James Benedict trans., 1993).
6

JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE TRANSPARENCY OF
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acteristics of junk speech are internalized by viewers and listeners, it is
mediocrity (not reason) and stupefaction (not truth) that rule.
One response to Collins and Skover is to argue that junk speech is
not as vile, stupid, or trivial as they contend. Cass Sunstein comes
close to taking this position when he asserts that "Mapplethorpe's
work is part of democratic deliberation" (p. 188). The question, of
course, is: why? Or, as Collins and Skover put it, "One person urinating into another's mouth has out-and-out deliberative democratic
meaning?" (p. 188). Apparently unfazed, Sunstein responds: "Okay.
All I want to say is that Mapplethorpe, in my view, is a sexually explicit [artist] whose work has self-conscious democratic implications. .

.

. Now I might be wrong on Mapplethorpe.

I'm perfectly

prepared to judge that" (p. I88 (omission in original)). I'm perfectly
prepared to judge it too. And if Mapplethorpe's photographic memorialization of urination into mouth has "self-conscious democratic implications," then so does any act of symbolic representation - which,
given an appropriate context, could be any human action.7
Now, of course, for anyone who has seen Mapplethorpe's work (as
opposed to just reading or hearing about it), it is possible - indeed,
even easy - to argue that it is art (a generously capacious designation). But what about the value of certain T.V. shows: Ren and
Stimpy, My Mother the Car, Beavis and Butt-head, The Partridge
Family, Wheel of Fortune, Ricki Lake, A Current Affair, and Cops?
These programs may, of course, have artistic value or "self-conscious
democratic implications," but if so, then what does not and why not?8
The problem is not that arguments to vindicate the value of such
speech-acts necessarily fail. On the contrary, the dilemma is that they
can succeed all too well. And that very success demonstrates quite
graphically that we no longer have the linguistic or cultural means to
distinguish between what has value and what does not.
Perhaps a better response to Collins and Skover is offered by Rod
Smolla, who claims that their bleak assessment of junk speech stems
from their elitist, intellectualist perspective (p. 129). Indeed, although
Collins and Skover effectively distance themselves from the elitist idealizations of First Amendment Panglossians like Sunstein (pp. 149-51),
they cannot disassociate themselves from the different flavor of intellectualist elitism inherent in their scathing evaluation of junk speech.
But, then again, neither can anyone else who arrives at the determination that this stuff is junk. Indeed, once that determination is made, it
7 Sunstein's heroic rhetoric concerning Mapplethorpe is typical First Amendment hyperbole.
Indeed, the champions of freedom of speech often wildly exaggerate the value of the speech they
seek to bring within the ambit of the First Amendment.
8 It is important to recognize that the point here is not: should these instances of speech be
protected by the First Amendment? Instead, it is: do we really believe what we are saying when
we assert that such shows have "self-conscious democratic implications" or "artistic" value?
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becomes somewhat difficult to argue, sans 6litisme, that the junk remains good enough for the masses. Precisely what would one say?
"Sure, it's grade B T.V. But remember that, on average, it's a grade
C citizenry. We're still ahead of the curve." Not likely.
Nevertheless, perhaps Collins and Skover are too quick and too
harsh in their condemnations. The relativist perspective might, after
all, be right, and perhaps it can even be rendered in nonelitist terms.
'rue, Beavis and Butt-head is not inspiring. True, Married With Children is filled with (self-conscious) self-loathing. 'Rue, A Current Affair
has an instinct for the gutter. And, true, Jenny Jones's white trash on
T.V. can furnish only so much insight. But, perhaps, these encounters
with the rude and crude bespeak a truth of our national culture. For
instance, the acid simplicity of the "that's cool"/"that sucks" dichotomy
on Beavis and Butt-head might be a lucid insight into the vacant
character of contemporary popular culture. (As an insight into the
normative structure of the vast bulk of American legal thought, the
contribution is, of course, unimpeachable - but that's neither here
nor there.) One problem with this line of argument is that, although
Beavis and Butt-head prompts a certain caustic awareness of our culture's vacancy, it also helps to reproduce the vacancy that is the object of its ridicule. Beavis and Butt-head thus emerges as a kind of
exercise in self-abasement - one is entertained by literally watching
as one's culture and one's self are abased: "We're really dumb, and we
know it." This state, of course, is not exactly exhilarating - either
intellectually or ethically. It is, instead, rather desperate. It is a state
one small step away from being abased and not knowing it - that is,
the state associated with much of the rest of T.V. programming.
A more convincing response to Collins and Skover is anticipated
by Jack Balkin. 9 He acknowledges the mindlessness of the electronic
media but intimates that it is precisely what it should be: the medium
of mindless relaxation that (like sleep) makes tolerable the exigent cognitive demands of contemporary waking life. 10 Collins and Skover
champion the logic of inscription: for them, the mindlessness of the
medium inscribes itself on the viewers. Balkin, by contrast, champions
the logic of decompression: for him, the mindlessness of the medium
enables the viewers to decompress in relatively harmless ways. Both
of these logics are plausible. And it is even plausible that they are
both correct: both inscription and decompression may take place to
some degree.

9 See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as ConstitutionalCategories, IO4 YALE LJ.
1935 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEMS OF FREE SPEECH
('993)).
10 See id. at 1939-42.
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Too Much Trash
One of the deleterious effects of all this junk speech lies in its very
prevalence. Junk speech captures large portions of the nation's available airwaves, occupying time otherwise available for "reasoned discourse" (or, indeed, any other activity).
One response to this claim is offered by Martin Redish, who states,
"Admittedly, much of television's programming is not designed to appeal to the viewer's higher intellectual interests. But for almost every
My Mother the Car there has been a Masterpiece Theatre" (p. 48).
This response strains credulity. Even apart from considerations of actual ratings (one suspects that even My Mother the Car was a much
bigger draw than Masterpiece Theatre), it is absurd to suppose that
T.V. achieves some sort of parity between the highbrow and the
lowbrow.
Cultural Vandalism
Another way in which junk speech produces harmful effects lies in
its appropriation and transformation of cultural markers and ideals.
For instance, advertising works by appropriating cultural ideals and
markers to sell products. In one T.V. commercial from i99i, the fall
of the Berlin wall becomes an occasion to celebrate freedom and, by
association, Pepsi-Cola (which we have come to know as "the choice of
a new generation'). The syllogism is as follows:
(i) Fall of Berlin Wall = Freedom;
(2) Freedom = Pepsi; and therefore,

(3)Pepsi = Fall of Berlin Wall.
The cultural impoverishment inherent in these equations has two aspects. First, a cultural ideal (freedom) and a complex cultural marker
(the fall of the Berlin Wall) are trivialized. Second, the metonymic
logic continues as both the ideal of freedom and the cultural marker of
the Berlin Wall are reduced to a commercial product. This degradation of ideals and cultural markers is typical of advertising. Hence it
is that:
The i96os African-American political declaration "Black is Beautiful" became a promotional anthem for hair products. Marketers later capitalized on the "X" in Malcolm X to sell baseball caps that since have
become fashion statements. John Lennon's "Revolution" became a commercial cause c6l bre for peddling sneakers, even as the songwriter
warned listeners to "free your mind instead." Women's equality became
synonymous with the liberty to smoke: "You've come a long way, baby!"
(p. 84 (footnotes omitted)).

There is, in short, nothing that cannot and will not ultimately be demoted to the order of the profane and the superficial.
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This abasement of the discursive world - even if it has not yet
affected the reasoning capacities of the public - is bound, according
to Collins and Skover, to impoverish our shared discursive universe
(pp. 9-io). It is T.V. that provides many of the shared narratives and
experiences that shape national culture and, thus, a common citizenship. Ed Rubin emphasizes this point when he affirms, in effect, that
T.V. is politics:
Throughout the country, people are watching the same shows at the
same time. They are listening to the same sports event.... [Television]
provides us with a common set of direct experiences, a shared body of
images, situations, and events. Its meaning for us lies in this interconnection; we perceive its programs not simply as news or entertainment, but
as national news or entertainment. Thus, television is intimately linked
to our concept of citizenship.... Indeed, this activity may be the average person's most important political act (p. 6o).
Contamination
If the effects of the unholy troika could be contained within discrete jurisdictional bounds, the threat would be limited. But we have,
according to Collins and Skover, already passed that point. The political sphere, for instance, is already suffused with the aesthetics of the
unholy troika (pp. 16-i9). Hence, political candidates are marketed
like fast food ("Where's the beef?') or breakfast cereals ("It's morning
in America.'). During the general election of 1992, the length of the
average sound bite dropped to 8.4 seconds (p. 19). Collins and Skover
quote Aldous Huxley's prophetic words:
[The consummate political figure] must be glamorous. He must also be
an entertainer who never bores his audience. Inured to television ....
that audience is accustomed to being distracted and does not like to be
asked to concentrate or make a prolonged intellectual effort. All speeches
by the entertainer candidate must therefore be short and snappy. The
great issues of the day must be dealt with in five minutes at the most and preferably .

.

. in sixty seconds flat (p. 14 (omissions in original))."

Accordingly, candidates for political office - indeed, even sitting Presidents - organize political events for placement on the evening news.
Image experts package and construct political action like commercial
advertising, fashioning press interaction with an eye toward televisual
transmission: sound-bites, eye-bites, photo-ops - all scheduled to "occur" in time for the evening news and too late for timely response by
the competition.
Even the pornographic makes its entry into the political arena
through stories calculated to sustain interest and defer satiation, stories

11 This passage comes from ALDous HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD & BRAvE NEW WORLD
REVISITED 46 (Torchbook ed. 1965) (quoting BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISITED).
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of: who did what to whom how many times where? Adultery and
sexual antics are traditional political fare. What is new, however, is
the mass exploitation of such topics for entertainment value. Hence,
the "serious" media have turned from their "gentlemanly" agreement
not to disclose the sex lives of politicians and officials to a leave-nostone-unturned investigation of their sexual misadventures. The result
is not necessarily pornographic (pubic hairs on Coke cans); it can also
be soap opera (the Packwood diaries) and even burlesque (Monkey
Business).12 But it is almost always tawdry.
Then, too, there is the feedback effect. Official government institutions, such as the Senate Judiciary Committee, are conscripted to aid
in the nation's entertainment. To the extent citizens pay attention,
these proceedings become vehicles of voyeurism. And all this "news"
is reported with the conspiratorial promise of giving the viewer "the
inside scoop, the real story" - in other words, some really hot gossip.
Bad Form
The very form of junk speech is deleterious to reasoned discourse.
The imagistic, nonsequential character of electronic, commercial, and
pornographic speech creates viewers and listeners who are receptive to
sensation and imagery, but not to conceptual argument. The faculty
of reason is neither evoked nor challenged. More than that, the audience is trained to become comfortable with incoherence and irrationality. Indeed, as the beer commercial suggests, "Why ask why?"
Although Collins and Skover do not say so explicitly, the intimation is that, even if one wanted to be wise, thoughtful, and insightful,
the unholy troika has so degraded the available linguistic material and
narrative tools that the likelihood of achieving these goals has been
dramatically reduced. Words lose their meanings as they become flat,
metaphorically bankrupt, exhausted.
It is difficult to see what the answer to this problem might be. If
the potential meanings of words are primarily a question of permissible (and forbidden) associations, then the deeply repetitive and crudely
stereotyped mass culture contributions of T.V., advertising, and pornography can hardly be benign.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

For academic legal thinkers - people who generally pattern their
professional identities on the model of idealized judges - the key
question is almost always the normative one: what should be done
about this predicament? More specifically, what should be done about

12 The references here are to the public discussions of the sexual conduct of Justice Clarence
Thomas, Senator Robert Packwood, and Senator Gary Hart, respectively.
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this disjunction between the lofty values of the First Amendment and
the ugly actualities of the speech world?
Collins and Skover frame the problem in a classic legal realist device - a perceived disjunction between the actual and the ideal, the
descriptive and the normative, the social and the legal (p. xxiii). To
this classic disjunction, they add a classic legal irony: the disjunction
has emerged not because of a failure to honor the ideal, the normative,
or the legal, but rather because they have been honored all too well.
Indeed, as Collins and Skover are quick to point out, the irony is
that it is the corpus of First Amendment law, values, and ideals that
has brought about this state of affairs (pp. 4-6). It is the fear of an
increasingly powerful state dictating what one can say (and think) that
has led to a permissive attitude toward electronic media, advertising,
and pornography. In turn, it is this permissive attitude that has allowed the stupefying mindlessness of T.V., advertising, and pornography to flourish. It is the fear of the Orwellian tyranny that has in
effect prompted our crossing into the Huxleyan dystopia - a brave
new world of triviality in which reasoned discourse is impossible (pp.
6-7).
What should be done? Once one focuses on this normative question, the problem and the irony mature into a paradox. In the legal
community, the question "What should be done?" is not asked as a
general open-ended ethical inquiry. On the contrary, for judges, lawyers, legal academics, and law students, the question almost always
means "What should the law do?" The presumption, in other words,
is that whatever should be done should be done by courts, legislatures,
or agencies - in short, the state.
But therein lies the paradox. For as soon as one contemplates state
action to avoid the deleterious effects of the unholy troika, the risk of
Orwellian tyranny emerges (p. 37). Collins and Skover call this denouement the classical scenario (p. 27). As an example, they consider
Anostopolo's extreme solution of abolishing T.V. (p. 29). Whether or
not this approach paves the road to Orwellian tyranny (an issue more
arguable than Collins and Skover let on), it is utterly utopian (in the
pejorative sense). It is as if one were to answer the problem of crime
in America with the suggestion that, in the future, people should try to
be nice. The problem with the classical scenario is that it grossly underestimates the extent to which the people really do want their MTV.
As Neil Postman tersely puts it, "Americans will not shut down any
part of their technological apparatus, and to suggest that they do so is
to make no suggestion at all" (p. 37).13
One could adopt a laissez-faire approach and refuse to use the
legal machinery to curb the numbing effects of electronic, commercial,
13 Collins and Skover are quoting NEIL POSTMAN, AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH: PUBLIC
DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOW BUSINESS 158 (1985).
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and pornographic speech. Collins and Skover call this approach the
modem scenario (and it doesn't work either) (p. 3o). The domination
of the speech realm by cheap entertainment and trivial amusement
means that words of political deliberation, meaningful public discussion, and effective dissent will not be uttered; if uttered, not distributed; and if distributed, not heard.
As for any attempt to avoid these two extreme scenarios by merely
reforming the realm of electronic, commercial, and pornographic
speech, Collins and Skover argue that such an effort is likely to prove
ineffective. They suggest that, even with government subsidy and intervention, worthwhile speech remains at a disadvantage if it must
compete with the amusing, the titillating, or the captivating (pp.
42-43). In addition, it seems unlikely that this reformist scenario
would succeed at harnessing only the virtues of the extreme positions
without also, to some extent, reenacting their vices.
All this, of course, presupposes that one accepts Collins and
Skover's depiction of the paradox. There are other options. One possibility is simply to deny that there is any disjunction between the
lofty Madisonian ideals and junk speech. There are several ways to
effect such a denial.
One approach is to reject (as, indeed, Redish, Smolla, Sunstein,
Strossen, and Tushnet variously do) the bleak characterizations of junk
speech. One can, for instance, provide more favorable descriptions of
the speech (Redish (pp. 47-48), Smolla (p. 133), Sunstein (p. 19o),

Strossen (pp. 191-92)) or deny that junk speech, bad as it may be, has
any serious causal or constitutive implications (Tushnet (p. 54)).
Another approach is simply to affirm that the normative thrust of
the First Amendment precludes taking into account the (possibly) awful character of junk speech. One can do this by suggesting that the
First Amendment forbids considering the offensiveness of speech as a
reason for withholding protection (Banner & Kozinski (p. 102)). In the
alternative, one could say that, inasmuch as Collins and Skover argue
that the unholy troika manipulates consciousness, they are adopting a
metaphysics of human agency that is at odds with First Amendment
principles. Their presumption that speech media can manipulate listeners is fundamentally at odds with core First Amendment commitments about the autonomy of the self and the relatively noncoercive
character of speech.
These are all very traditional arguments that can be answered with
very traditional counterarguments (which will not be rehearsed here).
Collins and Skover themselves raise a more interesting possibility.
They argue that contemporary belief about the First Amendment may
well be organized around a contemporary version of Plato's "noble
lie." According to Collins and Skover, a small legal elite might be deliberately romanticizing and elevating the value of junk speech in or-
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der to maintain the Madisonian ideals. The noble liar thus
deliberately misdescribes junk speech in lofty Madisonian terms. The
noble liar believes that, by invoking the Madisonian aspirations, some
Madisonian hopes might rub off: we must pretend that we are better
than we are in order to become so. In addition, the liar believes that,
by ascribing lofty Madisonian value to most junk speech, the liar
might ensure that Madisonian norms can still be used to withhold
First Amendment protection from the most egregious and threatening
instances of junk speech.
What is interesting about Collins and Skover's version of the noble
lie is that it accounts plausibly not only for a great deal of First
Amendment rhetoric, but also for the contemporary state of belief in
law among legal actors generally. 14
WHAT

ABOUT

LAW?

The dissonant conditions that render the noble lie plausible in the
First Amendment context are present throughout the law. Those who
understand themselves to be "doing law" must act as if they believe in
the law, in its self-representations, and in its promises to effectuate its
claimed ends. But, of course, to any person who is not busy "doing
law," the claims of law often seem quite preposterous - simply not to
be believed. Consider the kinds of things that American law asks
judges, lawyers, law teachers, and law students to believe:
that law is open and generally known to the public;
that human action generally comports with Newtonian conceptions of causation;
that the legislative or bureaucratic actions of collective bodies,
like legislatures, can be analyzed in terms of the human attribute of intention;
that there are determinative methods for deciding whether a
case is "correctly decided";
that human states of mind comport with a schema that conveniently breaks down into the cognitive states known as "intent,"
"recklessness," and "negligence."
Then, too, we are asked to believe that there exists some technique or
faculty that enables us to balance incommensurable goods (for example, the flag against the First Amendment) in order to reach correct
outcomes. We are asked to believe that such balancing decisions are
intersubjectively valid among a sufficiently large community (namely

14 See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 8or, 850-52
(199').
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citizens) or a sufficiently enlightened community (namely the legal profession) that the decisions are legitimate.
Among the intellectual elites, it takes a special mind to believe
such things. 15 It takes a legal mind - one that can be perfected
through years of arduous training. Acquiring a legal mind, however, is
not without its psychic costs. Imagine, for a moment, a person who
believed all of the above not only in his capacity as a law student or
an appellate advocate or a sitting judge or a professing academic, but
as a whole person. Imagine someone, in other words, who took the
empirical, aesthetic, and metaphysical representations of Supreme
Court opinions as valid descriptions of social life. We would be dealing, I think, with someone on the brink of madness.
To varying degrees, first-year law students are invited to participate in this madness. They are led to believe, for instance, that the
doctrine of proximate cause is valid social theory. In the realm of the
First Amendment, they are prompted to believe that speech is very
often weightless - noncoercive, nonmanipulative, and nonperformative. They are invited to believe these things not simply as "law," but
as valid descriptions of the social reality to which the law will be
applied.
Although this kind of true belief endures in some law students,
most, no doubt, eventually shed this untroubled faith. Students come
to understand that these beliefs are germane to the enterprise of law.
They are views one must hold or pretend to hold to "do law." The
law student realizes that it would be error to suppose that these views
are valid descriptions of social reality. Instead, the law student comes
to believe that these views are valid descriptions of reality for the limited purpose of "doing law." This mind-set is the beginning of a wellknown and recursive disjunction:
SPEECH
FORMAL
INFORMAL
ACT
PRECINCT
PRECINCT
what the law
in class
outside of class
student says
what the law
in class
in the
professor says
faculty lounge
what the judge
in open court
in chambers
says to counsel
what the conference
at the podium
in the hall after
panelist says
during the panel
the panel
This disjunction embraces both belief and disbelief. Hence, to "do
law," the legal actor must not only profess that the beliefs he or she
15 These points, and the ones that follow, are further elaborated in CAMPOS, SCHLAG &
SMITH, AGAINST THE LAW (forthcoming x996), and PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW MYsTIcIsM, FETISHISM AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND (forthcoming i996).
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holds are valid descriptions of the relevant social reality, but also that
they are his or her own. 16 An appellate or trial court advocate cannot
reveal to the judge or the jury what may well be the informal truth of
the matter. He or she cannot argue in court: "Look, I'm just a lawyer,
and I think the argument I am making is a pretty good one, but of
course, I don't believe it for one second." On the contrary, the advocate
must profess belief (even if it is not there).
To describe things this way foregrounds the sense of disjunction.
This disjunction can appear in different guises - more or less acute,
more or less problematic. Hence, at times it assumes a material form:
for instance, it emerges as a discordance between the law-talk of formal
precincts (the classroom, the podium, the courtroom) and the law-talk of
the informal precincts (the hallway, the faculty lounge, the judge's
chambers). At other times, it appears as a dissonance between "law in
action" and "law in the books." At still other times, the disjunction is
expressed as a formalized distinction between the so-called "internal"
17
and "external" perspectives.
The disjunction can emerge in many other forms. But the important
point is that, however manifested or expressed, this disjunction remains
a crucial aspect of the ontology of American law: it does not go away.
This disjunction is one that a person "doing law" must at the same time
recognize and yet deny. This condition is tragic because the stratagems
for dealing with it are not terribly satisfactory.
One can, of course, recognize the disjunction and deny its force.
This path leads either to formalism or opportunism (neither term is pejorative here). On the formalist side, one simply denies any social referent
that falls to conform to law. One understands law to be fully effective
in describing and constituting the objects that it purports to regulate.
When one is "doing law," there is nothing else. What seems objectiona16 For a discussion of this dual character of the authenticity (or inauthenticity) of belief, see
JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP 11-12 (1995).

17 The distinction between the internal and external perspective has been a mainstay of much
of American legal thought Here it is rendered by Professor Ronald Dworkin:
People who have law make and debate claims about what law permits or forbids ....
This crucial argumentative aspect of legal practice can be studied in two ways orfom two
points of view. One is the external point of view of the sociologist or historian ....

The

other is the internal point of view of those who make the claims....
This book takes up the internal, participants' point of view; it tries to grasp the argumentative character of our legal practice by joining that practice and struggling with the
issues of soundness and truth participants face. We will study formal legal argument from
the judge's viewpoint... because judicial argument about claims of law is a useful paradigm for exploring the central, propositional aspect of legal practice.
RONALD DwoRKiN, LAw's EMPIRE 13-14 (1986) (emphases added); see also H.L.A. HART, THE

CONCEPT OF LAw 88-9I (ig6I) ("[ilt is possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as
an observer who does not accept them, or as a member of the group which accepts and uses them
as guides to conduct. We may call these respectively the 'external' and 'internal points of
view."). For a sustained criticism of the distinction and its deployment, see Schlag, cited above in
.
note 14, at g16-29
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ble about this approach (from an external standpoint) is its imperialism,
its mechanistic self-confidence, its violent and arrogant disregard of
other forms of life. On the opportunist side, by contrast, one simply
gives up on any transcendental role for law - understanding implicitly
that law is a rhetoric, a lie, a useful way to get things done. What
seems objectionable about this approach (from an external standpoint) is
its amorality, or even immorality.
One can also recognize the disjunction and fail to deny it. This path
leads to legal nihilism (not a pejorative term here). This option is a
plausible orientation for someone who studies rather than "does" law or
someone who is talking about law in an informal precinct. It is not
plausible, however, for someone who is "doing law" in a formal precinct.
What seems objectionable about this approach (from an external standpoint) is that, for those who are "doing law," this approach cannot be
lived - at least not authentically.
Most American legal thinkers reject the extremes of formalism, opportunism, and nihilism. Instead, their main stratagem lies in a redemptive view. The disjunction is expressed in a time line formatted in the
great image of progress: the present is inadequate, but the future shows
great promise. The redemptive view admits the disjunction between the
legal and the social, the ideal and the real, and the normative and the
descriptive, but holds that, in time, the former can still be perfected and
used to regulate, organize, and constitute the latter. The redemptive
view thus recognizes and denies the disjunction. The recognition lies in
an admission of a disjunction in the present. The denial operates
through a presumption that normative prescription can eventually bridge
the gap.
This view is expressed, at times, in such various perfectionist jurisprudences as realist policy analysis, critical legal studies, neo-pragmatism, and law and economics. All these schools of thought acknowledge
that law is not what it represents itself to be. But in each case, there is
also a redemptive promise that the law can be made to conform to its
ideal self-representations.
All of this perfectionist jurisprudence presupposes, of course, that the
ideal representations of the law - all these normative arguments consisting of lofty hopes, noble values, sound policies, appealing principles,
and well-crafted doctrines - somehow regulate the actual uses made of
law by litigants, lawyers, and judges. It is not easy to believe such
things - at least not for those legal thinkers who are acquainted with
the coercion, wheedling, needling, harassment, and other rude and crude
practices of lawyers.1 8 How then can legal thinkers maintain the faith
that law is regulative of its actual social uses? This is a difficult
question.
18 See Edward A. Dauer & Arthur A. Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE
L.J. 573, 581 (1977).
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Certainly, it is not an inconceivable notion that the ideal representations of law are regulative of law's uses. On the contrary, some such
notion has been conceived over and over again throughout the history of
American legal thought. It has been, and still is, a tacit background
presumption of analytical jurisprudence, normative legal theory, and
doctrinal analysis. 19 Yet, once one begins to question whether the ideal
representations of law are regulative of its uses, the faithful affirmation
of the presumption is a complete nonstarter. What is needed instead is
an argument to buttress the view that the ideal representations of law
are regulative of law's ruder and cruder uses.
Here, one should note that the philosophical argument that it is necessary to make such a presumption is of no moment whatsoever. This
argument typically goes something as follows: to have law at all, one
must presuppose that law is indeed regulative of its own deployment. It
may be true that this presupposition is a precondition for "law" properly
so-called. And it may be true that, unless the precondition holds, we do
not have "law" properly so-called. But even if this is true, it cannot
establish that in any given social context, the law invoked by various
social actors is indeed "law" properly so-called. Nor does the point
change, however much those social actors may desire that their law be
"law" properly so-called. This philosophical argument about the necessary internal conceptual structure of "law" as regulative is neither here
nor there when the question is precisely whether, in any given social
practice, the invocation of law is regulative of its uses or not. In this
context, the presumption quite simply begs the question.
It is not easy to believe that the ideal representations of law are regulative of its uses. Not only must one believe that the crucial relation is
that of regulation, but one must believe as well that the ideal representations of law are distinct from their uses. This last presumption is made
routinely by all manner of academic legal thinkers in the pursuit of their
own jurisprudential projects. Collins and Skover invoke this presumption as well in setting up their legal realist tension between the legal and
the social, the ideal and the real, the normative and the descriptive.
Although they do not explicitly endorse the lofty Madisonian values,
they do accept these values as normatively authentic and thus as worthy
2 0°
of respect
Yet one wonders to what extent such presumptions about the regulative role of authentic ideals or values are plausible. One wonders to
what extent the academy that trades in such ideals or values is not itself
already under the influence of the commercial, electronic, and pornographic logic of the new state. Indeed, one can easily wonder to what

19 See Schlag, supra note I4, at 870-79.
20 For an inquiry into the potentially counterfeit ontology of "values," see Pierre Schlag, Values, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 219, 224-27 (1994).
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extent law review articles are anything more than advertisements for the
professional self.
Like commercial advertising, law review articles trade in pleasing
images. Legal thought has become a vehicle for the delivery of those
signifiers crucial to the target audience: law as craft, law as order, law
as transformative action, law as morality, and so on. The fascination of
legal academics with this year's "in" terms displays the same kind of
feverish attention that Madison Avenue devotes to this year's ad formulas in Advertising Age.
Much of normative legal thought might well be considered as a kind
of trashy feel-good literature for legal thinkers. Relative to the tastes,
hopes, and fantasies of the target audiences, is there really that much
difference in the end between Law's Empire and a Danielle Steel novel?
Danielle Steel's heroine wants to swoon, to feel the earth tremble, to be
taken from this world in a love so deep that ....

It will happen. But,

it will only happen after overcoming sustained and highly dramatic adversity. The legal academic, similarly, wants to be supremely just, to
experience a law that is the best it could ever be, to submit to a jurisprudence so majestic, so encompassing, that it will take him out of this
world to a realm of a "[1]aw [that] works itself [so] pure" that .... 21 It
will happen. But, it will only happen as a result of achieving Herculean
power and vanquishing countless jurisprudential enemies.
The extraordinary grandiosity common to both works (and their respective genres), the unbelievably flattering portrayal of the characters
with which the reader is meant to identify, and the fantastic structure of
the narratives when compared to their earthly social referents, bespeak a
common aesthetic. It is the aesthetic of the romance. In both cases, the
works (and their respective genres) deliver the goods as broadly and as
efficiently as possible. In both cases, we have mass-market romance which means that the story line must remain highly schematized, leaving
22
the reader to fill in the details at his or her option.
Not all legal thought, however, is romance. A great deal of it is
gaming, on the order of Trivial Pursuit. Whether in the genre of legal
process, analytical jurisprudence, moral philosophy, deconstruction, or
law and economics, there is a great deal of legal thought that does very
little except trace out, in acutely self-referential detail, the mazes of its
particular conceptual universe. It is difficult to find a cogent explanation for the production or consumption of this sort of work. One might

21

Ronald Dworkin, The x984 McCorkle Lecture: Law's Ambitions for Itself, 71 VA. L. REV.

173, 173 (z985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 1 do not mean to suggest, of course, that the two

kinds of works are equal in their intellectual or ethical content. My point is that relative to the identities of their target audiences, the two
kinds of works play largely the same roles, institute the same aesthetic, and instill the same
dreams of hope.
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thus be led to the otherwise counterintuitive conclusion that, like Trivial
23
Pursuit itself, this sort of thing is actually entertaining to some people.
Whether we are talking about tracing out the minute legal process
implications of this or that case or about a grand and captivating display of normative signifiers, legal academia, like the commercial entertainment culture, is taking a holiday from the serious and the
troublesome. Like the prototypical Hollywood blockbuster, the true
piece de resistance in legal thought must end on a high note. In days
past (pre-1970), this requirement meant writing an article that would definitively resolve a legal problem - so definitively that no one would
dare to write about it again. As this task has become recently impossible, the piece de resistance must now simply end on a note of cheery
normativity (no matter how bad things get along the way). Hence it is:
that legal formalism may be intellectually exhausted, but sound
24
policy analysis can infuse it with new life;
that the professionalism of the American lawyer is lost, but he or
she can still find rewarding work in a small law firm
25
environment;
that Supreme Court opinions are written by clerks and read like
C.F.R., but that somehow law is still a kind of literature worthy
26
of comparison to the works of Plato or Aristotle;
that there was a golden age of law (tentatively identified as 1958)
to which we can return despite the fact that the doctrinal dreck
produced by this jurisprudence is precisely what we are com27
plaining about now;
that the practice of law is fraught with commercialism, greed, and
predation, but that teaching "skills" and "values" to law students
28
will help repair the profession.
There is a lack of seriousness to much of contemporary American
legal thought.29 In some sense, this lack of seriousness may always have
been there. What is different now is that American legal thought is sub23 And this is not a wholly implausible supposition. See Arthur Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J.
989 passim (1978).
24 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479,
1483-84, iSo6-ii (1987).

25 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 311-12 (1993).
26

See

JAMES B. WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE, LAW, AND

POLITICS 178 (I994).
27 See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 197-98 (1994).
28 See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 235-36 (1992).
29 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW passim (199s) (criticizing many schools of
American legal thought); Pierre Schlag. Law and Phrenology, iro HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
1997) (manuscript at 23-37, on file with the Harvard Law Review).
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ject to increased pressures from the commercial culture of entertainment,
amusement, and triviality. What legal thinkers have offered, by and
large, are law review parades of pleasing normative imagery and detailed games of acute legalism. Sometimes, we even get both at once:
traditional legal process obsessionalism combined with unrestrained normative messianism.
Either way, it is hard to escape the thought that we are in a period
of flourishing decadence - one in which many legal thinkers, having
abandoned all hopes of serious intellectual or political work, have devoted themselves to increasingly crimped wanderings through the doctrinal maze or to ever more effusive self-congratulations of their chosen
profession (or both).
DECADENCE
Decadence, if taken seriously, is not an insult, but rather a diagnosis. And it is not one that can be thrown about lightly, for its grammar is generally inclusive of all those who are within the culture. This
will usually include the author as well, and keep him or her from issuing such a reckless diagnosis. But perhaps legal thinkers should face
up to this possibility forthrightly. There is more than enough evidence
of decadence all around to make it a plausible theme.
Collins and Skover's book, The Death of Discourse, may well be
evidence of this decadence. What they describe is a culture in decay
- one that can no longer believe its ideals, one that can advance
these ideals coherently only as a lie, one that is almost completely
given over to mediocre forms of distraction. Then too, Collins and
Skover's idiosyncratic form, their jurisprudential slumming, their
sometimes lowbrow delivery, and their occasional wallowing in commercial sloganeering and pornographic imagery are symptomatic of
decadence.
So are Collins and Skover decadent? Perhaps. But if one were to
look around the legal academy for the jurisprudential equivalent of
Nero, whom would one pick? Who is busy savoring the elixir of nostalgic jurisprudential reminiscence? Who is indulging in pleasant normative fantasies? Who is averting the gaze and closing the mind?

